Abstract: Two key factors in the success of general-purpose computing platforms are the creation of a technical standards architecture and managing an ecosystem of third-party suppliers of complementary products. Here we examine Symbian Ltd., a startup firm that developed a strong technical architecture and broad range of third-party complements with its Symbian OS for smartphones. Symbian was shipped in nearly 450 million mobile phones from 2000-2010, making it the most popular smartphone platform during that period. However, its technical and market control of the platform were limited by its customers, particularly Nokia. From 2007 onward, Symbian lost market share and developer loyalty to the new iPhone and Android platforms, leading to the extinction of the company and eventually its platform. Together, this suggests lessons for the evolution of a complex ecosystem, and the impact of asymmetric dependencies and divided leadership upon ecosystem success.
INTRODUCTION

Dynamics of Platform Competition
For nearly 30 years, researchers have been interested in the sort of de facto standards battles that are common in consumer electronics, computing and communications. The early research by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and others established a positive-feedback network effects model mediated by the supply of specialized complementary assets (see Gallagher & West, 2009 for a recent summary). Meanwhile, investments in such assets created switching costs that together with network effects often made insurmountable an early lead gained in a standards contest (Arthur, 1996; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007) .
From this, researchers have identified the dynamics of complex architectures of standardized components termed platforms (Morris & Ferguson, 1993; Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Eisenmann, 2007) . Here we focus on computing platforms as defined by Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999: 4) : "as a bundle of standard components around which buyers and sellers coordinate efforts", rather than definitions that might include as a platform the world wide web, or specific applications such as a web browser or Microsoft Office.
One key to platform success is a technical architecture of standards that both facilitates complementary assets and allows re-use between vendors and product generations (Gabel, 1987; Bresnhan & Greenstein, 1999; West and Dedrick, 2000) . A successful technical architecture allows modular innovation by both the platform sponsor and by third party complementors (Baldwin & Woodard, 2010) . Firms that control the interfaces of such an architecture -usually through application programming interfaces (APIs) -can control of the supply of complements and thus the allocation of profits that accrue to the platform (West and Dedrick, 2000) .
Another key antecedent of platform success is courting and maintaining a vibrant supply of third party complements ("software") that makes a product ("hardware") more valuable (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . While early research argued that a popular standard with a large installed base would automatically attract such a supply of complements, moderators of the positivefeedback process mean that standards sponsors make technical, product and economic choices that make a standard more or less attractive to complementors (Gallagher & West, 2009 ). The platform sponsor must share returns of platform success with complementors to assure an ongoing supply of complements (Gawer and Cusumano, 2005) . The interdependence of the sponsor with its complementors creates an ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor, 2010) . Although a sponsor should be able to capture "outsized returns" once an ecosystem is established (Adner, 2012: 117) , excessive value capture by the sponsor threatens not only the survival of the complementors but also the entire ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Simcoe, 2006) .
Smartphone Platform Competition
The personal computer platform of Microsoft Windows and Intel processors ("Wintel") is perhaps the most often cited example of platform success. Here we examine the efforts by mobile phone producers to replicate the Wintel adoption success while avoiding the economic rents captured by Microsoft and Intel. With its partners, Symbian Ltd. created the smartphone category and enjoyed rapid success as it sponsored the most popular smartphone platform from 2002-2010, accounting for nearly 450 million smartphones sold worldwide during that period.
Symbian's initial strategy followed many of the key principles of platform leadership defined by Gawer (2010) : technology design, strong relations with complementors, internal organisation, firm scope. Symbian built a technical architecture that was the first one optimized for smartphones, i.e. cellular phones that were also programmable mobile computing devices.
Symbian also built a successful ecosystem that enabled a wide range of devices from multiple manufacturers, and had the largest supply of third-party application software. Its internal organisation was focused on developing and distributing an advanced smartphone operating system. Finally, Symbian worked with its shareholder-customers -the world's five largest handset makers -to provide a scope that included firms representing 80% of the industry.
However, Symbian's success did not prevent its own extinction, nor that of its platform. The company faced successive competition from two rival mobile computing platforms -Apple's iPhone and Google's Android -that more closely emulated PC capabilities, created a new dominant design and by late 2010 had captured a majority of the market (West & Mace, 2010; Kenney and Pon, 2011) . This led to a series of desperate attempts at retrenchment as Symbian licensees abandoned its platform for Android. Finally, the sole remaining customer (Nokia) orphaned Symbian in favour of a smartphone derivative of the same Microsoft Windows quasimonopoly it had long sought to avoid.
While the story of the iPhone and Android success may be familiar to contemporary readers, less well known is that the Symbian platform had developed elements of the dominant design years before the iPhone or Android. The first Symbian smartphone from Ericsson in 1999 had a point-and-click interface with a (for its day) spacious LCD screen, while starting in 2006, Nokia phones on the Symbian platform used the same WebKit desktop browser technology as later shipped with the iPhone and Android. Even less well known is that Symbian had discussed creating its own application store in 2005 -three years before the iPhone App Store -but abandoned the project due (in part) to a lack of resources.
Here we document the rise and fall of Symbian Ltd. and its Symbian OS platform. We use this to describe how the firm built a complex ecosystem of stakeholders, evolved this ecosystem over its 10-year lifespan, and how limitations in its conception and leadership of this ecosystem limited its ability to respond to the iPhone and Android threats.
Research Design
Our study uses a case study research design, a widely accepted way to understand and explain complex interorganisational relationships to develop theoretical insights (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989) .
Throughout our study period, we compiled data regarding the firm's platform strategies from a wide range of primary and secondary sources. Primary data from Symbian included current information on its website, archived press releases dating back to 1998 that were published on the website, and previous information from the company website stored on the Internet Archive (Archive.org). We also referenced unpublished company memos and presentations, particularly around the evolution of the company's formal ecosystem program during each of its phases. We utilised shareholder reports listing full audited financial statements during those years (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) when they were made available to employee-shareholders.
We conducted interviews with current and former Symbian employees who managed aspects of its ecosystem strategy spanning the company's entire existence from June 1998 to November
2008.
1 We were also guided by participant observation by the second author, who was the only senior executive to span the company's entire lifespan and was directly involved in the second phase of the ecosystem program. Finally, we supplemented our data with secondary data on the company and its ecosystem. We drew upon news coverage, particularly in The Register, a UKbased IT news site; and summaries of the company's history and strategy in books by Symbian authors.
From this, we develop insights regarding the tradeoffs in managing a complex ecosystem, including the cognitive limits to ecosystem design. We focus on the unique form of divided leadership between Symbian and its partners, and the resulting ambiguity in both perceived and actual leadership in the platform that contributed to its eventual difficulties.
CREATING THE SMARTPHONE INDUSTRY
Symbian Ltd. was founded as a spinoff of another London-based company, Psion PLC, but was co-owned and funded by the world's largest handset makers (see Table 1 for key dates).
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Psion was created in 1980 to develop PC application software, but soon shifted to developing a family of keyboard-based pocket computer systems: Organiser I (1984), Organiser II (1986), Series 3 (1991) and Series 5 (1997) . These products became part of a product category called "personal digital assistants" (PDA), which also included the Sharp Zaurus (1993), the Palm Pilot (1996) and various "Handheld PC" models using Microsoft's Windows CE (1996 had happened in the PC market and were determined not to let that happen in the mobile phone market" (Price, 1999) . By aligning Symbian with the three (later five) largest handset makers, they also hoped to limit Microsoft's eventual market share. In response, a few months later Microsoft's CEO Bill Gates termed the Psion spinoff "serious competition" in a memo leaked to the New York Times (Markoff, 1998) .
Symbian Ltd. was a software company whose primary focus was to license the Symbian operating system to the world's leading handset makers to produce what it termed "smartphones". Beyond the ability to make voice calls on GSM mobile phone networks, the phones inherited the capabilities of Psion's organisers (such as calendar and address book), to which Symbian and its partners added features suitable for a mobile Internet device (such as email and web browsing).
The firm was launched with approximately 160 employees transferred from Psion Software.
By the time it had grown to 1000 employees in 2004, technical employees -both R&D and technical consultants -comprised 77% of that total. Because it shipped no products directly to end users, it had a relatively small sales operation that worked with handset makers, while the marketing organisation focused on generating industry visibility to attract end users and third party developers.
Symbian's shareholders were its spinoff parent (Psion) and mobile phone makers that were also its customers. Psion and Symbian hoped for an IPO of the company, but it was blocked by the handset makers. Instead, shares were bought by handset makers, with Nokia acquiring the largest stake (47.9%) in 2004 (West, 2013) .
Like other operating system companies, Symbian sought to maximise the supply of software supplied by third parties and thus the value created by that software. At the same time, as with any platform it was forced to trade off advancing the OS capabilities against providing continuity of interfaces for such software.
Symbian's ecosystem had key differences compared to the PC archetype. While the Windows ecosystem gradually emerged during the period 1981-1991, Symbian created an ecosystem strategy even before shipping its first product, a strategy that evolved across three distinct phases in its first decade. Without Microsoft's independent funding and control of key applications, Symbian had less supplier power and platform control. The management of the Symbian ecosystem was also constrained by the complexities of complements, systems architecture, distribution and ownership relations not present in better known computing architectures.
ARCHITECTING A SMARTPHONE OS
Modular Architecture
The Symbian platform consisted of the Symbian OS, a user interface framework, and an ARM-compatible CPU. ARM did not make smartphone CPUs, but licensed its reference designs to a wide range of semiconductor makers and worked closely with Symbian and the CPU makers to deploy each generation of its architecture (Chambers, 2006: 100-103 The platform allowed for Java-based applications and (except for NTT DoCoMo customers) native C++ applications. Each handset maker licensed a Java interpreter, as well as an engine for editing word processing and other office documents. Makers of CPU, graphics and other chips customized the operating system for maximal compatibility with their hardware.
Subplatforms
While the first phone (Ericsson R380) , had a custom user interface that was used only once, Symbian had designed its operating system to make it easy to change the user interface "look and feel". Unlike the Windows (or later Android) mobile phone platform, these custom UIs allowed each handset vendor to offer distinctive products. In the end, five different user interfaces were developed (Table 2 ), but only three shipped more than 5 million units.
Series 60 (later S60) was created by Nokia and licensed to other handset makers. This was the most popular user interface, both in terms of distinct models (145 designs 5 from nine vendors) and also unit sales (more than 350 million). It was character-and-icon based, with a cursor key and numeric keypad (later also a QWERTY keypad) as primary input devices. By virtue of its customer power, Nokia forced Symbian to accept Series 60 as a replacement for the "Pearl"
interface, which was partially developed by Symbian but never used in any shipping product (Orlowski, 2010) .
Series 80 was a UI developed by Symbian and maintained by Nokia, optimized for Nokia's 9000 series phones and exclusive to Nokia due to its patents (Orlowski, 2010 Each user interface was in effect a sub-platform of the Symbian platform, each with its own UI-specific APIs. Because the UI makers had source code to the operating system, they (particularly Nokia) added their own UI-specific APIs to the Symbian OS; most (but not all)
APIs were eventually migrated back to the shared Symbian code. Each user interface also had its own preferred web browser. At the same time, the proliferation of UIs increased Symbian's coordination costs and fragmented the application market. (In addition to controlling the user interfaces, handset makers also controlled the lowest level interfaces for the platform, the hardware adaptation layer.)
Programming Interfaces
Building upon Psion's EPOC, the Symbian OS APIs used a customized version of the C++ Unix hackers for ease of rapid prototyping, it offered only a subset of the S60 APIs (Scheible & Tullos, 2007) .
Finally, at the behest of network operators (who distributed more than 90% of the world's mobile phones) in 2004 Symbian took steps that ended up making software development more difficult. The Symbian Signed initiative was intended to prevent viruses and other malware from taking over a handset and causing damage to a handset or the network (Morris, 2008) . While security was widely seen as necessary, software developers voiced frustration over the resulting technical difficulty and bureaucratic approval delays.
SYMBIAN'S EVOLVING ECOSYSTEM STRATEGY
When Symbian was founded, it faced crucial challenges in building an ecosystem to support its technological innovation. Despite its inheritance from Psion, the new firm would need a new ecosystem. Its managers did not know what sort of ecosystem would be required: like its competitors, it assumed that smartphone ecosystems would be similar to those for PDAs.
As its technology grew more popular, it attracted a growing number of potential ecosystem members, each wanting attention to solve their particular problems. At the same time, it was a small and (until 2005) a money-losing company with limited resources. Thus, a crucial challenge was prioritising its scarce resources to build an ecosystem of unknown characteristics.
Finally, it faced two immediate competitors in Microsoft and Palm, at least three major future competitors largely unknown in 1998 (as well as indirect competition from in-house handset software development by potential customers). As with most software companies, the intellectual property of its software copyrights and trade secrets were its major assets and it worried about leakage of that IP to existing or potential competitors (cf. Cusumano, 2004) . Ultimately, these IP concerns coloured (and hindered) its willingness to transfer knowledge to ecosystem members, and thus its ability to attract new members and to help them create value.
Symbian's Ecosystem: Overview
Symbian OS was only available to phone users pre-installed in a newly purchased Symbianenabled phone. This meant that unlike a PC, Symbian could not sell end-user software upgrades and had effectively no direct relationship with customers. Instead, adoption of its latest technology -and revenues -depended on new adoption of smartphones and replacement purchases by existing owners.
Symbian described its network of customers and complementors as an "ecosystem" 6 (e.g. Northam, 2006) . Different categories of licenses and partner relationships included:
• System integrators or "Licensees" (handset manufacturers) that integrated externally sourced and internally developed hardware and software to create new devices (i.e.
handsets) for sale to end users.
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• CPU vendors worked to assure Symbian OS compatibility with their latest processors.
• Other hardware suppliers provided drivers for their respective hardware components.
• User Interface companies were division of mobile phone companies or (for UIQ Technology) a separate company.
• Other software developers, sometimes referred to as independent software vendors (ISVs). This included developers of user applications and also middleware components such as databases.
• Consultancies and training centres. Symbian provided Licensees a list of certified contract software development companies it called Symbian Competence Centers, whether mobile phone-specific consultants, or the Symbian-oriented departments within large outsource software suppliers such as Satyam and Wipro.
• Network Operators, which in most countries were the dominant distribution channel for phones, and also decided what software components were preloaded on phones.
• Enterprise software developers, for cases where a company developed Symbiancompatible software for its employees that used Symbian phones.
In many cases, members of Symbian's ecosystem were also members of competing mobile phone ecosystems, such as those surrounding Palm OS, Windows Mobile, and later Linux-based platforms such as the LiMo Foundation and Google's Open Handset Alliance (Android). Such divided loyalties were found not only in chipmakers and operators, but (unlike with personal computers) the system vendors who made phones that incorporated the Symbian OS.
Knowledge transferred to partners came in three forms: codified documentation, personalized technical support, and Symbian's source code. Most partners had access to only a subset of source code, while both UI companies and mobile phone operators asked Symbian to limit access to sensitive interfaces (such as those that might allow a wayward application to make expensive telephone calls). For employees that had full source code access, it came at a price: Symbian demanded a "refrigeration period" (typically six months) -during which the engineers were blocked from working on complements for competing platforms -for fear that they would unintentionally apply concepts of the Symbian code in a way that would improve the capabilities of Symbian's competitors.
Symbian's strategy for managing its ecosystem can be divided into three phases: "ad hoc" (1998 ), "Platinum Program" (2002 , and "Symbian Partner Network" (2008).
Phase 1: An ad hoc Ecosystem Strategy
The initial structure and conception of the Symbian ecosystem was heavily influenced by its PDA forebears, and the well-known exemplars of PC and other computer ecosystems. • A Symbian Technology Partner program, for companies providing technology (such as multimedia engines or compression modules) to run alongside Symbian OS;
• A Semiconductor Partner program, for companies providing hardware components to phone vendors;
• A Tools Partner program, for providers of compilers, integrated development environments, automated test facilities;
• A Development Partner program, for firms supplying technology to Symbian itself;
• A Connectivity Partner program, for companies providing solutions for synchronising and backing up data between mobile devices and desktop computers. Over the next few years, Symbian's actual ecosystem and the pattern of ecosystem coordination evolved from the original Psion-inspired model (shown in Figure 2 ) to a new model ( Figure 3 ) that differed from the earlier conception in two key ways:
• Many partners were supplying software to phone manufacturers, but needed a greater amount of technical information and software than was contained in the SDKs designed for ISVs;
• These same partners (termed "Licensee Suppliers") needed two-way exchange of software with phone manufacturers, in ways that neither the OCK nor the SDK had envisioned or provided for.
Although Symbian had serious and well-managed programs to manage both phone manufacturers and ISVs from 1998-2002, in retrospect it underemphasized helping those companies that supported the phone manufacturers in creating devices, delaying the availability of new phones and thus new Symbian customers.
Phase 2: Symbian Platinum Partners
Around July 2001 a proposal was created to unify many aspects of the previously separate partnering programs, into a new "Platinum Partner" program. The main differences were:
• A deliberate preference for firms providing technology supplied in devices, rather than software added on afterwards. The "device creation" related partners included not only phone manufacturers (e.g., Nokia), but providers of hardware components (e.g. Texas
Instruments and Intel) and those that provided bundled middleware (e.g. Sun and Real Networks) or development tools (e.g. Borland and Metrowerks).
• A desire to systematise the efforts of running many different partner programs, and to obtain benefits of scale through having common development kits, event management, billing systems, and communications systems.
A key aspect of the new program was a new package of software provided to technology suppliers, known as the Development Kit ("DevKit"). This contained considerably more software than in the SDKs provided for ISVs, as well as additional licensing rights, but stopped short of the software and rights available to phone manufacturers. Meanwhile, the software package previously known as the OCK was re-designed as the "CustKit" (Customisation Kit).
The program was discussed internally for nine months, before being announced in April 2002. Reasons for the delay before launching the program included:
• Internal discussions over the appropriate membership fee for the program. Initially, annual fees of $15-25k were proposed. After some time, the concept emerged of a lower • "Licensee Suppliers" were renamed as "Partners" (sometimes referred to as "Device
Creation Partners"), and the emphasis on supporting them increased because of their important role in helping create new phones;
• Previously ad hoc support mechanisms from Symbian to different Partners were reorganised around the existence of the new DevKit;
• Previously ad hoc exchange of information and software between Partners and Licensees became governed by contractual terms in the new DevKit License (DKL);
• Symbian put less priority on direct support of ISVs, on the assumption that the task of supporting applications developers would shift to the phone makers and those companies' UI systems, which after 2001 were located outside Symbian.
Instead of directly supporting ISVs, Symbian's Developer Network program would concentrate on being a hub of support for the developer networks in partner companies, who would in turn support ISVs.
Once the Platinum program structure was in place, it grew rapidly: by the end of 2002, it had attracted 100 companies, and nearly 300 by early 2006. Even as the program grew in size, Symbian management felt constant conflict between "quantity" and "quality" of partners:
• The "quality" approach involved a preference for the larger companies that seemed most likely to become winners in the Symbian space, or which had special endorsements from Symbian's customers.
• The "quantity" approach followed the principle of "level playing field" -avoiding picking winners, but giving an equal opportunity to small and unknown companies; the idea was that even though a given company might have the best technology of its type at one moment in time, this should not become a reason to imagine that company would remain indefinitely as the leader in its space.
Efforts to provide openness with a "level playing field" required more resources required to administer a larger program -including keeping track of contacts, preparing and chasing invoices, providing technical support, and running larger partner events.
Other difficulties in running a large partner program were already anticipated at the time the Platinum program was created. An April 2002 analysis of the partner program (Wood 2002) noted two potential problems. First, many firms were trying to become partners, but they varied widely in terms of their ability to deliver meaningful products. Secondly, Symbian did not have a large enough technical staff to provide the desired level of support for all possible partners.
For these reasons, a prioritisation scheme was viewed as inevitable, and partners (including potential partners) were internally allocated to different tiers of importance: AA, A, B, and C.
The AA partners were 15 companies deemed most critical to Symbian's success, A-level were 50 companies of high significance, the B level were those with at least one internal champion, and the C level comprised the remainder (Wood 2003) .
Finally, ecosystem members differed significantly in their rights to use Symbian's IP. Phone manufacturers received all source code to Symbian OS 9 whereas partners did not receive socalled "Category A" source code that was deemed to be particularly sensitive. Based on an assumed "hub-and-spoke" model, partners could only distribute their changes to selected Symbian OS software to phone manufacturers (at the "hub"), not to another partner. Over time, it became clear to Symbian management that both restrictions hindered the free flow of valuable information and innovation among the ecosystem; both restrictions were eventually removed.
Symbian benchmarked the Platinum program on an ongoing basis: almost every year between 2004 and 2007 there were one or more internal review projects to consider major improvements in the partnering programs. These projects usually started optimistically: people would say things like "It should be easy to stop wasting effort on the low-value partner engagements and to put more effort onto the high-value partner engagements". But each time, the optimism changed to acceptance that easy optimisations of the program had already been made, and that partnering activity which initially looked low-value was often highly valued by important Symbian stakeholders (key customers, internal strategists, and so on).
Phase 3: Symbian Partner Network
In Symbian's major challenge was in North America. For example, in the summer of 2004, the Symbian platform had a 6% share of the US mobile device (smartphone and PDA) market, after 43% for Palm OS and 25% for Windows (Canalys, 2004) . One major problem is that Symbian developed a version of Symbian for CDMA networks -which accounted for a majority of US subscribers -but Nokia cancelled its CDMA phones before they could be released and the CDMA modifications sat on a shelf, unused.
10
Another obstacle was winning distribution for phones from the US's three (later two) nationwide GSM operators. In particular, the largest-Cingular (later AT&T) -wanted weak suppliers and so rarely carried any phones from Nokia, the global mobile phone leader. As a consequence, Symbian was dependent on the relatively weak T-Mobile.
When Nokia brought its first Symbian phone to the US, the $600 Nokia 9290 Communicator, without operator support it distributed the phone via computer dealers, IT consultants and its website. Nokia even opened retail stores in NY and Chicago in 2006, but closed them in 2010.
Firm Success
Despite rapid organisational growth and market share success, Symbian faced severe resource constraints, suffering years of losses developing its platform prior to achieving economies of scale sufficient to support its R&D efforts. Building on the Psion code base, Symbian spent (by our estimate) more than £200m on R&D from 1999-2004 to develop three major Symbian OS releases. It achieved its first operating profit in 2005, a year in which its revenues and unit sales more than doubled, and the year Nokia launched its high margin Nseries phones (Table 3) .
Symbian suffered from a lack of pricing power, particularly from 2004 onward, when Nokia accounted for more than 75% of unit sales. In early 2006, Symbian was pressed by shareholdercustomers to adopt a reduced royalty schedule. The company would no longer receive a $2.25 surcharge on the first two million handsets of each major OS release. More significantly, the ordinary royalty shifted from a flat $5 fee to a graduated scale from $5 to $2.50 (Symbian, 2006).
The latter provision benefited only Nokia -the only company to ship more than 5 million Symbian phones in a single year -and was in fact adopted at its behest.
Finally, of Symbian's handset customers, only Nokia was able to achieve economies of scale for its product and UI platform development costs. While Nokia averaged sales of more than 3 million units per smartphone, Sony Ericsson averaged less than 1 million, and also had to support the UIQ subplatform development with less than 10% of Nokia's smartphone revenues.
Assessing Symbian's Platform Success
At the beginning of 2008, Symbian's platform and ecosystem strategies had achieved great success. It had attracted 9,282 third-party software applications and in 7½ years, its operating system had been shipped in 200 million phones, the most in the industry (Symbian 2008b).
Throughout its ecosystem strategy, Symbian had ongoing debates over the balancing between competing goals such as quantity vs. quality, fairness vs. focus, and personal attention vs.
economies of scale. In making such decisions, the Symbian executives and ecosystem managers faced three major limitations.
The first was a cognitive blindspot towards the nature of the ecosystem. As part of the Psion PDA (and PC) legacy, Symbian's founders initially took for granted that its ecosystem would be like Psion's PDA ecosystem; the implicit assumption was that the major focus of ecosystem management was working with independent software vendors. In this regard, application software as the most important complement to general purpose computers was the dominant logic (as defined by Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) of the computer industry of that era. A related assumption was that add-on applications were crucial to the value of a smartphone -true for PCs and game consoles, arguably false for PDAs and demonstrably false for conventional mobile phones.
Secondly, new handset models were delayed because Symbian did not anticipate how hard it would be to create devices that were unmatched in complexity for a consumer electronics device.
Wood (2005) identifies a number of potential pitfalls of mobile phone production, including changes in operating system (or UI) APIs across new releases, problems with third party software reliability and integration, and contractual delays in obtaining rights to distribute such software.
Finally, Symbian's ecosystem management had limited resources and had to be selfsupporting -particularly until Symbian earned its first profit in 2005. Rather than maximizing partner access, the partner program was limited to providing services to those partners willing to pay enough money to support the cost of providing those services. These restrictions were gradually reduced through IT-enabled efficiencies, including shifting from paper to "click through" agreements and distributing information via an extranet rather than CD-ROM.
Symbian's shifting treatment of application software was also problematic. Under its initial ecosystem strategy, the company focused on applications at the expense of helping handset makers and those providing pre-installed software that had to be ready to ship with the handset.
These early priorities delayed the availability and sale of smartphone handsets that would attract buyers away from conventional handsets, create an installed base for application developers, and also provide revenues to Symbian that would reduce its severe resource constraints.
During the second (Platinum Partner) phase, applications were de-emphasized and ISVs received less attention. Only limited progress was made on improving tools and broadening developer support, and the cost to ISVs remained relatively high. It was only after the release of the iPhone that Symbian began to develop the Symbian Partner Network to broaden the reach and lower the cost -a development that was rendered moot by Nokia's acquisition of Symbian.
Finally, while the size of the software ecosystem continued to grow with the number of applications, Symbian made little effort to ascertain the health of its ecosystem, or to question why there were no great successes akin to the Lotus, Borland, Ashton-Tate and others of the early PC era. As it turns out, after-market software sales for Symbian smartphones remained low, as did the software unit price -both more similar to PDAs than PCs. Unlike a platform leader who squeezes complementors for profits in a zero-sum game (Gawer and Henderson, 2007) , Symbian did not intend to starve its complementors, but focused more on its own problems than theirs.
These difficulties suggest two modifications to the positive-feedback network effects model (cf. Gallagher & West, 2009 ). First, while theory asserts that more software increases hardware sales, this assumes the ceteris paribus condition that attracting software does not delay the development or sale of hardware. If the hardware has a direct utility without adding software complements -and if the hardware must compete with an established substitute to attract buyers -this suggests the early priority must be on creating an installed base of hardware.
Second, the attractiveness of a platform to complement providers is not merely the size of its installed base, but the installed base size times its propensity to buy complements. If a given platform (or product category) has a higher propensity to install complements -whether PCs vs.
smartphones or between competing videogame platforms -then that creates a larger addressable market. Similarly, a lower unit price for complements is attractive only with a large installed base, high purchase propensity, or low specialization cost (cf. Teece, 1986) Finally, Symbian's entire "open" platform strategy arguably depended on it being an independent supplier not beholden to any one customer -which was plainly no longer true after (West, 2014) .
SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED DECLINE
The year 2007 marked the high water mark for both Symbian unit sales, but also for its influence on buyers, complementors, handset makers and public perceptions. A little more than three years later, Symbian Ltd. had ceased to exist as a legal entity and its technology was and then (in 2008) a direct distribution mechanism for third party software applications (West and Mace, 2010) . These characteristics were copied by a series of Android phones (Kenney and Pon, 2011) , thus cementing the dominant design for a consumer-oriented smartphone.
Anticipating but not Meeting Architectural Challenges
With its clear focus on creating the smartphone category, Symbian and its partners had anticipated key elements of the dominant design before Apple, but failed to execute on bringing them to market or to combine them into a single product.
The UIQ interface was a stylus-based input method, and a full-sized display (albeit at lower resolution) was characteristic of the earliest Sony Ericsson phones -P800 (2002), P900 (2003) and P910 (2004) 
Adapting to a New Ecosystem Paradigm
Symbian also faced a challenge to its fundamental ecosystem strategy -first from iPhone on openness to complementors, and then from Android on openness to handset vendors. Both posed a challenge that Symbian was unable to meet.
In July 2008, Apple launched the iPhone App Store, providing an application distribution mechanism that bypassed both third-party distributors and the operators' own application stores.
The new store offered an unprecedented feature for a computing platform: a built-in way to directly sell and install all third party applications. It also provided Apple with 30% of all download revenues, although a large proportion of the applications were provided free.
The new App Store grew dramatically: while Symbian had taken 7½ years to acquire nearly 10,000 applications, the iPhone app store reached 15,000 apps after six months and 100,000 after 16 months (West & Mace, 2010) . The success of the App Store attracted customers and complementors, bringing tremendous favourable publicity for Apple.
In response, sponsors of the Android, Windows Mobile and BlackBerry platforms all announced their own app stores. Symbian took 15 months to launch its own app store andconstrained by both Nokia and its operator partners -was not allowed to sell directly to users.
Instead, Symbian provided wholesale distribution via Nokia's Ovi store and the operators' stores, neither of which proved as well-implemented or popular as Apple's or Google's app stores.
By one estimate, total 2010 app store revenues reached $2.2 billion; Apple's store accounted for 83% of the total, with software developers receiving $1.25 billion and Apple's commission -28 -revenues reaching $535 million (Whitney, 2011 ) -more than Symbian's entire 2007 revenues.
As it turns out, Symbian had considered creating its own application store back in 2005. The proposal failed to attract support within Symbian and eventually died for several reasons.
Symbian felt it had been successful in attracting third party complements; lacking a comparison it was unaware of the financial pressures its developers faced; and it saw the store as a distraction and an expense, rather than as a source of significant revenues to solve its own financial pressures. Because Symbian lacked direct access to customers, it would also require the cooperation of its handset customer-shareholders and carriers, both of which later resisted its efforts to create an app store even after Apple's success with the iPhone App Store.
The other challenge came from the Android platform, which shipped its first smartphone in 
Platform Extinction
Challenged by Apple and Google, Nokia made a series of increasingly desperate moves to preserve its smartphone market share, leading to the phased elimination of Symbian Ltd. and its platform. In June 2008, it announced it would acquire the remaining 52% of Symbian Ltd. for Finally, the divided leadership of the ecosystem limited the ability of Symbian and its ecosystem to respond to the new dominant design created by the iPhone.
Evolving a Complex Ecosystem
Prior research on ecosystem strategies has suggested how sponsors can control and manage their ecosystem to best advantage, by orchestrating the value creation and taking for itself the largest share of the value capture (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Maula et al, 2006) . While this may be a desirable steady state goal, our data suggests that finding the path to that state is far from trivial -both due to the complexity of the task and the information available to the ecosystem leader.
At best, optimising the performance of an ecosystem built around some complex assembled product requires aligning the interests of a heterogeneous population of ecosystem members and partitioning (or self-assigning) the technical and business responsibilities among those members.
Any actor has the choice to participate or not in the ecosystem; for many industries, this choice is influenced by the decision of whether to participate (non-exclusively) in one or more competing ecosystems. Finally, the actual (or prospective) failure of any ecosystem member may cause it to withdraw from an ecosystem, leaving a gap that is may be filled only after a considerable delay.
To this complexity, we add the inherent uncertainties (and unknowability) that come with a new ecosystem around the firm's new platform. These uncertainties will be greater for a new firm, without prior firm-level reputation products or ecosystem experience. They will be even worse for a new-to-the-world technology or product category, where there is no direct precedent (known to any party) for partitioning the business and technical responsibilities across ecosystem partners. A firm without products or an ecosystem will have to make assumptions about what technologies and business relationships it will need to create value. As Alan Roderick, onetime head of the Symbian Platinum Partners summarized it: "In the early days, nobody knew where smartphones were going to go, what they were going to be capable of, or what it would take to make them sell." To use the Mintzberg (1978) formulation, any ecosystem strategy has its intentional and emergent aspects, with the former manifest by the firm's activities, structures and programs to create and nurture an ecosystem, and the latter arising from firms that choose to join the ecosystem, pressures from competing ecosystems and broader changes in the environment.
If a firm enters a market without an existing ecosystem, then where does the firm's initial ecosystem strategy come from? Our data -and the industry standard practice that influenced our subjects -suggests two possible cognitive heuristics that shape ecosystem formation. First, the firm and its managers will build upon the firm's (or their individual) prior ecosystem experience -as when Symbian founders learned from their Psion experience. Secondly, lacking a large body of formal knowledge on ecosystem management, firms adapt strategies from similar ecosystems: in this case the Windows ecosystem was extremely influential.
Both Symbian and Nokia lacked the platform experience of an Apple or Microsoft in terms of managing a successful general purpose computing platform across multiple generations.
Meanwhile, Symbian seriously underestimated the complexity required to transform an electronic pocket organizer to a general purpose, Internet-connected mobile computing device. And unlike in Mäkinen and Dedeheyir (2013) -where the platform progress was limited by third party software -here the limiting factor was the ability of handset makers to integrate software. Even after Symbian had shipped its first complete operating system, the weaker software development capabilities of its handset makers (and their UI companies) meant they had difficulty keeping up with Symbian (and eventually, rival platforms) in implementing new platform features. As with other examples of loose coupling identified by Brusoni and Prencipe (2013) , the entire ecosystem suffered when there was poor execution by one key party.
Asymmetric Dependencies with the Ecosystem
Symbian depended fully on the success of its platform, as did many of its application suppliers. However, this was not true of other members of its ecosystem, such as semiconductor makers, handset makers and network operators. Unlike Symbian, this second group generated revenue from other mobile phones, not just Symbian. Nokia emphasized premium prices (of up to €1,000 for its best phones), maximizing its gross margins while limiting the number of customers available to Symbian and application providers. When other manufacturers (Motorola, Sony Ericsson) had less success selling Symbian phones, they sold non-smartphones or phones using
Windows or (later on) Android.
Additionally, competition between handset makers within the ecosystem undercut efforts to build a common platform, and align the interests of the entire ecosystem to its shared success.
Nokia, Ericsson and NTT DoCoMo each built separate subplatforms to support their respective aims, and Ericsson's subplatform never attained the scale necessary to support its R&D costs.
Outsiders such as Samsung, Panasonic, LG and Siemens had difficulty developing for Nokia's S60 and grew wary of depending on the Nokia-controlled platform -much as IBM's rivals were wary of OS/2 (cf. Grove, 1996) . Compared to Frankort's (2013) optimistic example of intraindustry cooperation and knowledge transfer, here the knowledge transfer was much less effective.
Finally, Symbian's success in attracting third party applications masked the difficulty its partners had in profiting from those applications. Relatively weak application sales were not a priority for Symbian and ignored by the rest of the ecosystem -until Apple's iPhone created a new distribution paradigm that dramatically increased developer unit sales and proceeds.
The Challenges of Divided Ecosystem Leadership
Normally identifying the ecosystem leader is clear-cut. When there are rival claims, Adner (2012: 116) argues that leadership can be inferred from the actions of others: "The leader is not the one who says, "I'm the leader." He's the one about whom everyone else says, "He's the leader." This is the litmus test of leadership."
From the date of its public unveiling, Symbian Ltd. was proclaimed as the leader of a new ecosystem by investor-customers who sought to transfer their legitimacy to the Symbian platform. However, over its 10 year-lifespan, the actions of these customers served to undermine that leadership as manifest by technical control, market control and financial control of the platform. At least four factors contributed to Symbian's declining de facto leadership.
First, its technical leadership -through control of application-facing APIs (cf. West & Dedrick, 2000) -was intentionally pre-empted by handset makers who asserted API control by creating custom UI layers. As Simon East recalled: "It became clear to us that Nokia had woken up to the fact that if these guys own the UI and the developer model -then that's where the value is going to migrate to" (Orlowski, 2010) . Relinquishing leadership both at the top (UI) and bottom (hardware) layers, Symbian and its platform suffered both from coordination problems with its licensees and also their generally weaker level of software development capabilities.
Second, because it didn't sell to consumers, Symbian both lacked a direct source of revenues and a marketing relationship to assert its leadership with the intended beneficiaries of the ecosystem, i.e. smartphone buyers. The top mobile computing analyst for one market research firm was stark in his 2001 warning:
[T]he main obstacle Symbian faces, [Ken] Dulaney said, is brand awareness. "They've really done a poor job of really raising (the image of) their company," he said, adding that Palm and Microsoft have been much better at branding their names.
Symbian has generally let the device maker do the talking while staying hidden in the background, Dulaney said -a strategy that isn't in the company's best interest.
"I think they really need to reverse that strategy," he said (Dano, 2001 ).
Third, because its shareholders (other than Psion) had inherent conflicts between their roles as investors and customers, the investors controlled Symbian for their benefit as customers rather than to maximize the value of the company and their investment (West, 2014 Although Microsoft competed with its application vendors, it enjoyed far more technical and market power than Symbian did in negotiating with handset makers.
This divided leadership ultimately hurt the Symbian platform and the ecosystem members, delaying its ability to respond to the iPhone, Android and the App Store challenges. As market leaders, Symbian and its partners (especially Nokia) initially discounted the iPhone threat.
Symbian was quicker than its partners to react, but lacked both the resources and technical control to react unilaterally. A key vulnerability -the browser -was not controlled by Symbian but its subplatform partners (particularly the market-leading Nokia smartphones) were vulnerable to direct comparison. Other aspects of the user experience (e.g. preloaded applications) were left to the handset maker or even the operator -a model rejected by Apple although later adopted with Android.
Future Research
There are inherent limitations as to the generalisability from a single case -in this case, a business ecosystem. The Symbian ecosystem differs from that for Windows Mobile, and significantly different from other mobile phone and computing ecosystems. Ecosystem relationships are considerably simpler in an industry where there is only one major class of complement such as with videogames, an industry where the degree of variation between firms and successive console generations cries out for a systematic study of ecosystem management.
In the tradition of Carliss Baldwin (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Baldwin & Woodard, 2010) , this work suggests further research as to the interdependence of the technical and economical relationships within an ecosystem. The Symbian ecosystem suggests that the technical structure is more enduring than the business structure. A piece of add-on software may initially be created The history of Symbian and its relationship to Psion can be found in Tasker (2000) and Northam (2006) . 3 Here we focus on the pocket-sized PDAs that eventually proved to the be dominant design for the product category, rather the unsuccessful, tablet-sized PDAs such as the Apple Newton (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) and AT&T EO (1993 -1994 that first gave the name to the category. 4 Motorola didn't actually finalize its investment in the company until October 1998 (West, 2013) .
5
We created a database of 304 Symbian handsets shipped 2000-2013 using the official public list of handsets on Symbian's website (both in 2008 and as stored on the Internet Archive), databases of phones on GSMArena.com and Japanese phones on Wikipedia.org, and press releases and news stories about handset releases.
6
The word "community" was sometimes used as an alternative, but "ecosystem" was generally preferred since "ecosystem" recognizes the reality that companies have competitive relationships, not just the "friendly" relations implied by the word "community".
7
Within Symbian, handset manufacturers were handled by the Sales division rather than Ecosystem Management, but manufacturers also had full access to all partner information and events. This source code excluded a very small portion that had been licensed in by Symbian from third party suppliers under a contract preventing any other company from seeing the source.
10
Nokia's decision to cancel its CDMA handsets was seen as tied to its patent disputes with Qualcomm (originator of the CDMA mobile standard) that continued until the two firms settled in July 2008.
11
Despite its (largely) open source code, Android scored lower than Symbian, Linux, Mozilla and five other mobile-related open source projects in an independent 2011 study of openness in open source communities (Laffan, 2011). 12 Such open source foundations were originally created to strengthen the negotiating position of volunteer individual contributors, but Nokia's intended use was deliberately modelled on the Eclipse Foundation, in which the foundation increases legitimacy by providing limited autonomy from its main corporate sponsor (see O'Mahony, 2003; West & O'Mahony, 2008) .
13
Two other investors -Panasonic and Siemens -exited handsets, while licensee Sendo went bankrupt. For Samsung and LG, Symbian was always one of several smartphone platforms, and in 2010 the Korean firms later became the 1st and 2nd largest makers of Android smartphones.
14 West & Dedrick (2001) were one of the first identify the potential divergence of Microsoft and Intel's interests, when Intel supported Linux as a server operating system competing with Windows. Since then, Microsoft has offered Windows implementations for mobile phones and (with Windows 8) even PCs that don't require Intel-compatible chips.
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